We present a model which considers both regulatory burden of offshoring barriers and possible terms of trade gains from such barriers. Non-tariff barriers are shown to be unambiguously welfare-reducing, and tariff barriers raise welfare only when associated terms-of-trade gains exceed resulting regulatory burdens, in which case there is a positive optimal offshoring tax. Otherwise, free trade is optimal. Welfare reductions from an offshoring tax are more likely with several developed nations engaging in offshoring. We derive and characterize the Nash equilibrium in such a case.
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Introduction
In recent years there has been a rise in protectionist sentiment in the US fueled in part by worries about job losses stemming from cheaper imports from China. The debate on this is far from settled. More importantly, there is the worry that improvements in offshoring technology will lead to shifting jobs abroad, in turn leading to higher unemployment and lower wages in the US. 1 These concerns have led to policy discussions regarding the use of offshoring regulations. A largely ignored issue here is the burden that US firms will face from such regulations, and how that may affect national welfare. In this context, we present a model which considers offshoring barriers, whose welfare effects and optimum levels we derive. 2 The basic two-country analysis is extended to the case of several developed nations.
A Two-country Model with Full Employment and Wage Flexibility in Both Nations
Let there be two nations, a developed home nation (H) and a developing foreign nation (F). All foreign variables are denoted by *. The developed nation offshores some tasks to the developing nation to produce a numeraire good X, whose production requires completion of a range of tasks
. One unit of labor is required in each task performed in H per unit of the good produced (we call this one unit of a task). Following Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) , offshoring costs take an iceberg form, such that ( )
to produce each unit of an offshored task, where β reflects the offshoring environment that applies to all tasks exported. Indexing tasks more costly to offshore with higher values of i, we 1 The current low unemployment rate makes it meaningful to use a full-employment model to focus more on wage effects. 2 Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) uses an international oligopoly model to show that market-share considerations can render offshoring barriers ineffective in raising domestic employment. This is an additional channel outside our paper that will also reduce the possibility of domestic welfare gain from offshoring barriers.
2 have ( ) 0 t i ′ > . β reflects both the general offshoring technology as well as regulatory burdens (or compliance costs) related to offshoring barriers. In particular, let R reflect the regulatory burden on a firm arising out of an ad valorem offshoring tax τ and non-tariff barrier ρ. While the tax generates revenue, it also increases paperwork for the firm and imposes regulatory burden.
Non-tariff barriers involve stricter border inspections among other factors. The following formulation captures this environment:
where β is a parameter reflecting offshoring technology at free trade.
Marginal Task Offshored
A task i is offshored to F if and only if:
As in GRH, we assume that task 0 i = is cheaper to perform in F and task 1 i = in H. Under these assumptions, and given continuity and monotonicity of ( ) t i , an interior solution obtains where (2) holds as an equality. Denoting the marginal task as I , we then have 
Labor Supply
Let W, the utility of a representative consumer in the home nation take the following quasi-linear form:
where e L is leisure and x c is consumption of X. The concavity of u(.) reflects diminishing marginal utility of leisure (increasing marginal disutility of labor). Let this consumer's endowment, L of labor time be allocated between labor and leisure. Also, let 0 T ≥ be a lumpsum transfer from the government to the consumer. Denoting the worker's labor supply by L , the consumer's budget constraint is:
Subject to this budget constraint, utility maximization yields the labor supply function as:
Similarly, labor supply in the foreign nation is:
Labor Demand and Full Employment Conditions
Full employment in H requires that: 
Zero-Profit Condition
The firms' unit cost of production c is the sum of their tax and transportation cost inclusive labor costs in H and F to complete all necessary tasks. Thus, using (3), we can express unit production cost as: 
Noting that the price of good X is unity, we use (10) to get the zero-profit condition as:
Equilibrium
Using (8) and (11) to substitute for x and w, respectively, we can use (9) to obtain the market clearing wage in F as:
Substituting (12) in (3), and using (1) and (11) we get:
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(13) establishes that the level of offshoring must fall with either an increase in τ or ρ .
Welfare Effect of Offshoring Restrictions
Let the tax revenue
be returned in a lump-sum manner by the government to the representative consumer. Using (4) and (5), and noting that
, welfare of the home nation's representative agent is:
Using some substitutions (14) reduces to:
Using (13) in (15) we get:
Evaluated at free trade,
Using (15), we find that ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Optimal Offshoring Barriers
It is clear from the discussion above that the optimal level of the non-tariff barrier is always zero.
However, if 
Model with Several Developed Nations
Let there be several developed nations, j=1,2,…n. Equation (1) is replaced by:
The marginal-task condition now is
Similarly, replacing all the relevant equations by their multi-country counterparts, we obtain the market clearing wage in F as: 
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Using (21) and (22), nation j's equilibrium offshoring level is:
Nash Policy Equilibrium:
Similar to (15) above, nation j's welfare is: 6 We can show that
Using (23) in (24),
; , ;
The first-order conditions of Nash welfare maximization for nation j are: 
which implicitly define policy reaction functions of developed nations.
A symmetric developed nation Nash equilibrium
The solution to the system of equations (26) defines the Nash equilibrium ( )
,.. ; ,.. . 
